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The European Union’s association offer to Western Balkans included, among 
other pre-accession political requirements, full cooperation with the Internati-
onal Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This requirement was envisa-
ged as one of the crucial elements of the EU conditionality mechanism towards 
Western Balkans, and has heavily dominated the EU’s external relations agenda 
with the Western Balkans states. This essay analyses structural preconditions 
in selected countries of the Western Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia 
and Serbia), and assesses impact of the ICTY conditionality on the dynamics of 
pre-accession Europeanization of the three states. With basis in both rationalist 
and sociological/constructivist meta-theories, discussion tracks down essential 
international and domestic factors, which if favourable facilitated the EU’s po-
licy of ICTY conditionality. Primary aim of the essay is to arrive to a descriptive 
and causal conclusions and get better understanding why both the application 
of, and compliance with, the ICTY conditionality was in the end rather trou-
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blesome and inconsistent process. Main argument is that in the case of each 
country observed, serious impediments undermining the ICTY conditionality’s 
effectiveness can be encountered within the every factor assessed, which can 
be used to explain disruptive application and compliance record of the ICTY 
conditionality.
Key words: European Union, Western Balkans, pre-accession political conditi-
onality, ICTY, international and domestic facilitating factors
1. Introduction
Enlargement is often regarded as the European Union’s ("EU") most su-
ccessful foreign policy tool. In its relations with the Western Balkans co-
untries, the EU sought to use the existing leverages in order to maximize 
the impact of its pre-accession conditionality, and as a contribution to 
the ongoing process of democratic transition in the region. The EU is ar-
guably the single most important international actor in this conflict-torn 
region, and thereby in a unique position of promoting ethnic reconcilia-
tion, democratization and economic revitalization (Mäki 2013: 53). Due 
to its inability to prevent violent conflicts during the 1990s, the EU has 
sometimes been referred to as having a "special responsibility" towards 
this region in facilitating post-war recovery and state-building. Thus, the 
EU has indeed acknowledged the prospect of membership for all We-
stern Balkans states, but has opted for an individual approach to the en-
largement and compliance assessment. As a result, one of the countries 
from the region (Croatia) had already acceded to the EU in July 2013.
Building up on the experiences of previous enlargement rounds, 
pre-accession requirements for the subsequent enlargements became in 
general more elaborate, encompassing, numerous and stricter (i. e. hard-
er-to-achieve), while in the enlargement strategy "several new leverage 
tools were included" (Slootmaeckers & Touquet 2013: 17). Therefore, 
the EU association and accession offer to Western Balkans was made 
conditional on the set of political requirements derived from the Co-
penhagen criteria, plus the additional specific criteria linked to the 
Stabilization and Association Process ("SAP") launched in 1999, which 
included (among other requirements) full cooperation with the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") – an ad hoc 
international criminal tribunal situated in Hague. This requirement was 
envisaged as one of the crucial elements of the EU conditionality mech-
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anism towards Western Balkans, and has almost exclusively dominated 
the EU’s external relations agenda with the Western Balkans states.
EU policy towards Western Balkans is predicated on the need to 
bring the "delegitimisation of extreme nationalist ideologies", and fa-
cilitate reconciliation as a pre-condition for EU accession (de Vascon-
celos 2009: 5). The ICTY conditionality thus stood out as a unique and 
unprecedented EU pre-accession mechanism since it was limited to the 
Western Balkans area, and presented the first instance in which the EU 
conditionality had been applied in the post-conflict region.
As a departure from the initial identity- and culturally-neutral tech-
nical criteria for EU accession established by the European Council’s 
meetings in Copenhagen and Madrid, the ICTY conditionality is one 
of the newly-devised "culturalised" criteria (Milenković & Milenković 
2013: 190), i. e. it appeared prima facie as "culturally" determined as it 
challenged, inter alia, issues like ethno-national identities and legacies 
of civil conflicts in the Western Balkans. Such requirements pose sig-
nificant challenge to political institutions in not yet consolidated de-
mocracies, leading to a situation described by Milenković & Milenković 
(2013) as a "democratic deadlock": consolidated democracy is necessary 
in order to achieve political stability for implementation of the basic EU 
accession requirements, while the instability itself is a result of the addi-
tional criteria (i. e. ICTY conditionality) and reactions to it.
Finally, after having functioned for more than two decades, the ICTY 
is in the "completion strategy" phase. For that, and given that the ICTY 
conditionality is no longer an issue in EU accession dynamics since all 
of the war crimes suspects have been extradited to The Hague, yet the 
Tribunal’s controversial jurisprudence is still highly disputed across the 
region and in certain instances used to radicalize nationalist rhetoric, a 
reflection on its specific use within the EU pre-accession conditionality 
at this point appears relevant.
From a more general and theoretical perspective, discussing the 
closely related topic of the EU conditionality tackling national identity 
issues Freyburg and Richter argue that:
"conditionality as an incentive-based instrument is only consid-
erably effective under certain preconditions suitable for catalysing 
substantial change in countries characterized by legacies of eth-
nic conflict" (2010: 14, italics added).
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This essay will therefore analyze these preconditions in selected 
countries of the Western Balkans, in order to arrive to a descriptive and 
causal conclusions and get more general impression and better under-
standing why both the application, of and compliance with, the ICTY 
conditionality was in the end rather troublesome and inconsistent pro-
cess. Analysis will thus be focused on a number of case studies and in-
dependent variables, latter derived from the Sedelmeier’s conceptual 
framework on the impact of accession conditionality on the dynamics 
of pre-accession Europeanization (2005: 11-16), introduced in the fol-
lowing part of this paper. With basis in both rationalist and sociological/
constructivist meta-theories, discussion in the present paper will follow 
essential international and domestic factors, which if favourable facili-
tated the EU’s policy of ICTY conditionality. Main argument is that in 
the case of each county observed, serious impediments undermining 
the ICTY conditionality’s effectiveness can be encountered within every 
factor assessed, which can be used to explain disruptive application and 
compliance record of the ICTY conditionality.
Countries included in the study are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia 
and Serbia, given that the overwhelming majority of the ICTY caseload 
(almost 95%) concerns these particular states, and towards them the 
ICTY conditionality has been exercised in the most extensive manner 
by the EU.
2. Theoretical Framework: Independent Variables 
Explaining Application and Compliance Record of the 
ICTY Conditionality
According to Sedelmeier,
"the strategy of conditionality is far from uniform and homo-
genous, and the EU’s application of conditionality varies across 
issue areas, target countries, and over time. The EU uses other 
strategies than conditionality to affect domestic change, such 
as persuasion and socialization of elites. A number of factors, 
not only at the domestic but also at the international level, affect 
the effectiveness of such strategies, and hence the EU’s impact" 
(2005: 10).
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Based on the two approaches within the framework of institutional-
ist theory – rationalism and constructivism – Sedelmeier suggests for-
mulation of specific hypotheses to assess whether or not the EU will 
have an influence, both with regards to factors related to the EU’s strate-
gies and domestic factors (2005: 10). His analytical framework contrasts 
rationalist and sociological/constructivist causal models for the EU’s 
domestic impact, and focuses on mediating factors at the internation-
al and domestic level, identified by and derived from the each of the 
two analytically distinctive approaches. Explanatory studies founded 
on such framework ask not only whether the EU has influence on the 
candidate countries, but also how and under what conditions the EU 
exercises such influence. The conditions and factors that determine the 
effectiveness of the EU’s influence are the independent variables in this 
research area. Devised analytical framework provides a generalizable 
and suitably broad basis to study the explanatory power of international 
and domestic factors emphasized by the rationalist and constructivist 
approaches respectively.
Borrowing from the Sedelmeier’s conceptual framework (2005: 13), 
for the purpose of this paper following main independent variables will 
be taken into account:
I. rational institutionalism approach:
a) international facilitating factors: clarity of EU demands; credibili-
ty of conditionality (including consistency in application, and in-
tra-EU consensus on rewarding compliance); power asymmetry, 
size and temporal proximity of rewards;
b) domestic facilitating factors: domestic costs of adopting rules for 
governments (constellation of party system, ethnic policy prefer-
ences in parliament, veto players); societal mobilization and sup-
portive formal institutions.
II. constructivist/sociological institutionalism approach:
a) international facilitating factors: legitimacy of EU demands, and 
of the process through which the EU formulates demands and 
promotes rules;
b) domestic facilitating factors: identification with the EU, and posi-
tive normative resonance of the EU requirements with domestic 
rules.
Rationalist institutionalism focuses on the EU’s use of conditionality 
to influence candidate countries, and suggests that "adaptational pres-
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sure from the EU changes the opportunity structure for utility-maxi-
mizing domestic actors" (Sedelmeier 2005: 10). This approach discards 
processes of socialization and persuasion as a mechanism for the EU’s 
domestic impact (Sedelmeier 2005: 15). However, constructivism/so-
ciological institutionalism holds that as a result of that very processes, 
elites in candidate countries become convinced that the EU’s rules are 
legitimate and have an intrinsic value (Ibid.). Therefore, governments 
adopt the EU’s rules regardless of the material incentives offered by the 
EU as an award for compliance. Rationalist approach also suggests that 
in order to have influence, the EU needs to have domestic allies in tar-
get countries, or at least the adjustment costs for target governments 
must not be prohibitively high (Sedelmeier 2005: 14). Constructivist 
institutionalism on the other hand emphasizes that the EU’s impact 
does not (only) depend on the domestic material interest constellations 
(Sedelmeier 2005: 16). If a candidate country – elites and publics – pos-
itively identifies with the EU, the government is more likely to be open 
to persuasion and to consider the rules that the EU promotes as legit-
imate and appropriate (Ibid.). This approach identifies another crucial 
domestic factor: the extent to which there is a "cultural match" or "reso-
nance" between EU demands and domestic rules and political discours-
es (Ibid.).
Following is the overview of selected independent variables, influ-
encing effectiveness of the policy of ICTY conditionality (being a de-
pendent variable this essay is intended to explain) in three countries 
of the Western Balkans. Given that some variables observed are closely 
intertwined, certain explanations offered will inevitably count for more 
than a single outcome. This essay will approach both theoretical per-
spectives with an assumption of their (at least partial) complementarity, 
thus covering explanations rendered on the basis of each of the theories.
a. Clarity of EU demands
The EU accession is a political project and conditions for each particular 
situation can change or at least modify. Accordingly, compliance bench-
marks may change for political reasons, and this makes the measure-
ment of an "objective" compliance status a cumbersome venture (Križić 
2012: 64). On the contrary, clarity of the EU’s demands is considered as 
an important factor increasing the likelihood of effectiveness of condi-
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tionality. Clarity means that the candidates know what they need to do 
if they decide to comply with the EU’s conditions (Sedelmeier 2005: 12). 
Conditionality rules are, however, often too loose and result in difficul-
ties when the candidates try to analyze the EU accession conditionality 
and what they are required to do. Conditionality is also subjected to po-
litical decisions made by the EU as a political actor that has sometimes 
prioritized other goals. Uncertainty might stem from evolving rules in 
the EU (e. g. unprecedented requirement of the ICTY cooperation), or 
from the absence of a single EU model in many policy areas (here again: 
transitional justice). Uncertainty also may arise from internal conflict 
among the Member States about the application of conditionality (Ibid.). 
Each Member State has its own agenda, priorities and judgment on the 
degree of compliance with the EU conditionality. This makes political 
conditionality less effective than more neutral and technical conditions 
spelled out in the SAA and accession process, which refer more directly 
to clear elements of the acquis (Batt & Obradović-Wochnik 2009: 12). 
All this is closely related to inconsistencies of the EU in setting and in-
sisting upon political conditions.
ICTY conditionality emerged as an additional criterion custom-
ized specifically for the Western Balkans, and as such tended not to 
be so technical in its nature. Bieber notes two principal problems with 
this type of conditionality: the EU lacks rules in the sphere; conse-
quentially, the EU cannot be clear in terms of the conditions, severe-
ly impairing the effectiveness of conditionality (2008:7). Moreover, 
ICTY conditionality was new policy instrument partly reflecting 
the EU’s pursuit of increasingly prominent foreign policy objectives 
over the past decade: transitional and post-conflict justice. Rangelov 
explains how this form of policy instrument embodied two distinct 
logics and approaches: democratization and stabilization (2011: 2). 
The democratization approach prioritizes justice as part of the ethical 
commitments of EU foreign policy to promote democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law, while the stabilization approach puts a pre-
mium on ending violent conﬂict and maintaining public order and 
political stability (Ibid.). EU pre-accession conditionality in the West-
ern Balkans provided ample illustration of these developments: it was 
shown that these two approaches at the EU level were often compet-
ing and conflicting, despite the fact that they were intended to coexist 
in practice. Prominent example of the democratization approach was 
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the suspension of accession talks with Croatia, and in contrast, of 
the stabilization in the EU relations with Serbia, which often prior-
itized stability considerations over justice goals. Therefore, increas-
ingly worried by the prospect of growing support for anti-Western 
right-wing radical nationalist forces, and strengthened by widespread 
bitterness at the loss of Kosovo and poor economic situation, the EU 
started offering Serbia various concessions notwithstanding lack of 
progress in cooperation with the ICTY (Hartmann 2009: 74). The 
Union therefore, majority of whose Member States backed Kosovo’s 
independence, gave away most of its leverage and remained with even 
fewer policy tools with which to influence Serbia. Thus, prioritizing 
stabilization of democratic government in Serbia, and softening ICTY 
conditionality for political reasons, EU seriously impaired credibility 
of conditionality, undermined its effectiveness, and "sent out an im-
age that its position is relative and that compromises can be made" 
(Dobbels 2009: 15).
As a result, perceived tensions between these two approaches have 
"framed the discussion of policy options at the EU level and sparked 
disagreement among Member States" (Ibid.). Ultimately, the goal of sta-
bilizing the region outweighed the main purpose of the ICTY, namely 
providing justice, and political agenda became dominant while the Tri-
bunal became a political instrument (Hoepel 2011: 55). EU Member 
States thus utilized the ICTY conditionality mostly as a policy tool for 
political purposes rather than to press for justice, causing both the Tri-
bunal and the EU to lose their credibility.
b. Credibility of conditionality
Intra-EU conflict about the application of conditionality relates to an-
other key factor that affects the EU’s impact: the credibility of EU condi-
tionality (Sedelmeier 2005: 12). Credibility has two sides: the candidates 
must be certain that they will receive the promised rewards after meet-
ing the EU’s demands, and furthermore that they will only receive the 
reward if they indeed fully meet the requirements (Ibid.). Thus, credibil-
ity depends on "a consistent, merit-based application of conditionality 
by the EU" (Ibid.). It suffers if political conflicts inside the EU make 
candidates doubt that the EU will deliver the promised rewards, and 
moreover if candidates suspect that political favouritism or some ulteri-
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or motives led the EU to reward other candidates who did not meet (all) 
the requirements (fully) (Ibid.).
A key factor that determined the effectiveness of conditionality is 
a credible accession perspective: membership is the most sizeable re-
ward and incentive that the EU can offer, but to be effective, it needs to 
be credible (Sedelmeier 2005: 31). In case of the countries which have 
only in principle a membership perspective, either the opposition inside 
the EU to enlargement more generally, or towards particular countries 
more specifically, have greatly reduced its credibility (Ibid.). The prob-
lem of credibility is particularly salient in the potential candidates in 
the Western Balkans, where the membership prospect is more distant 
than for the previous candidates, due to the complex political situation 
(post-conflict societies, contested statehood) and lack of economic re-
forms.
As it was oftentimes emphasized, the EU conditionality is saturated 
with inconsistency in its implementation. There have been numerous 
cases demonstrating the inconsistency with which the EU applied con-
ditionality and its "backsliding from sanctions when particular selfish 
economic and security interests were considered to be paramount to 
normative political conditionality" (Perković 2013: 6). In the case of 
ICTY conditionality, this was repeatedly confirmed too. After continued 
resistance by the Western Balkans states to cooperate with the ICTY, 
and with the EU making dilemmatic political decisions, the pressure 
for compliance with ICTY conditionality became watered-down. For 
instance, key condition of full cooperation with the ICTY was inconsis-
tently applied in relation to Serbia because EU often shifted the focus of 
its conditionality policy to the unresolved issue of Kosovo, in light of its 
anticipated declaration of independence. Even when Serbian authorities 
were obviously failing to cooperate with the ICTY, the EU responded 
with a compromising and softened requirements. Similarly, in Croatian 
case the meaning of "full cooperation" changed from "fully cooperating" 
to actually "finding general Gotovina", and in the eyes of domestic and 
international public the EU was acting inconsistently and losing credi-
bility (Perković 2013: 8). And in the case of Bosnia, ICTY conditionality 
was compromised due to other more pressing reform areas related to 
the EU pre-accession policy, e. g. the police reform was a major obstacle 
for concluding the SAA, although the ICTY cooperation was incom-
plete and presented an unfulfilled requirement too, but was somewhat 
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side-tracked and emphasized less frequently. This inconsistency caused 
a certain backlash, given that it left too much space for political maneu-
vering and aggressive nationalistic rhetoric. Faced with artificial politi-
cal crises emerging partly as a reaction to its conditionality, the EU re-
sorted to tactics of remission and mitigation ultimately resulting in EU 
conditionality being weakened and undermined (Memišević 209: 64).
Inconsistent application was stimulated by the inter-institution-
al dynamics and clashes. In general, while the Parliament and some 
Member States argue for a tougher approach on conditionality, others 
in the Council advocate a more lenient stance (Dobbels 2009: 13). In 
the foreign policy domain, the latent institutional conflict between the 
Council and the Commission has surfaced very acutely in the context of 
the EU’s Western Balkans policy where the "lack of coherence in policy 
coordination and implementation has created serious risks for the EU’s 
external performance as a driver of domestic change" (Noutcheva 2006: 
26). Additionally, EU institutions have different approaches towards the 
concept of transitional justice: the Council has considered transitional 
justice as a short-term post-conflict issue, while the Commission has 
tended to understand it as a long-term reconciliation issue (Unger 2010: 
10). All this has intensified the inter-institutional rivalry and harmed 
the EU’s pre-accession policy in Western Balkans. As a result, the prob-
lem of institutional fragmentation and poor coordination among dif-
ferent EU and other external actors caused inconsistent use of ICTY 
conditionality, thus inhibiting EU’s transformative power in Western 
Balkans and damaging its international credibility as a "normative pow-
er"(Börzel 2011: 6).
Furthermore, inconsistent application of the ICTY conditionality 
was closely related to the weakness of the EU Member States in strug-
gling to act and speak "with one voice". Member States were divided 
in two groups. One advocated a strict policy of conditionality in order 
to avoid repeating the "mistakes" of the previous round of enlargement 
(Bulgaria and Romania in 2007). Other held that the EU’s policy of 
conditionality would be more effective if it involved giving significant 
intermediate rewards to applicants in order to show the credibility of 
association process, but also out of fear that aggressive and hostile EU 
position would not enhance compliance but rather foster the national-
istic rhetoric and risk destabilizing the entire region, or that e. g. Serbia 
would lapse into the Russian sphere of influence if "the EU pursued a 
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policy of strict conditionality against the backdrop of negotiations on 
Kosovo" (Dobbels 2009: 15).
Also important is that the inconsistent application of the ICTY con-
ditionality was moreover strengthened by discrepancies stemming from 
the overlapping mandates with other international actors. For instance, 
including Bosnia in the NATO’s Partnership for Peace ("PfP") program 
in late 2006, when the cooperation with ICTY was unsatisfactory, argu-
ably weakened EU’s leverage. Similarly, after the USA had softened its 
stance on ICTY cooperation by granting its certification on financial aid 
and assistance for Serbia, and also endorsed its prospect of joining PfP 
program, pressure mounted on the EU to soften its policy of condition-
ality as well (Dobbels 2009: 14).
c. Power asymmetry, size and temporal proximity of rewards
Salient characteristic for all three Western Balkans countries is that they 
faced heavy power asymmetry (even in comparison to previous EU en-
largements), and they had relatively little to say in the process of the 
development of the ICTY conditionality (Mäki 2013: 57). Furthermore, 
the ultimate reward of EU membership is indeed a sizeable benefit for 
candidates, but sometimes the payment of the reward is distant (Sedel-
meier 2005: 14). Western Balkans countries (at least initially with re-
gards to Bosnia and Serbia) were faced with an uncertainty concerning 
eventual membership. Approximately until 2005, the EU did not tie co-
operation with the ICTY to any specific reward in relation to Serbia and 
Bosnia, and only the renewed attention for potential candidates after 
the "big bang" enlargement of 2004 brought about change in this matter.
Furthermore, Bosnia and Serbia have been subjected to conditions 
by other international organizations and transnational actors, such as 
of the NATO, Council of Europe, the US diplomatic and financial re-
sources, all conditioned upon cooperation with the ICTY (Bieber 2008: 
7). The EU thus shared tasks with other actors in order to promote and 
maximize compliance with the ICTY conditionality, resulting in what 
was referred to as "parallel" or "cross-conditionality", describing the in-
terplay of EU’s leverage and multiple external factors on domestic pol-
itics. This plethora of conditions interlinked, yet distinct and evolving, 
reduced the incentives for compliance, and furthermore offered limited 
rewards (Ibid.). As the new and different conditions building upon the 
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ICTY conditionality emerged (e. g. police reform in Bosnia), a sense of 
an "open-ended process" arose which caused inconsistent compliance 
with the original requirement (Ibid.).
ICTY conditionality clearly proved the most effective once it was un-
ambiguously tied to immediate rewards (e. g. start of negotiations on the 
SAA in 2005 for Croatia, or the entry into force of the SAA in 2008 for 
Serbia), and once it had become clear that the SAA was indeed the first 
step towards future accession to the Union (Dobbels 2009: 10). However, 
even after these intermediate rewards and with the prospect of the SAA, 
compliance has not always been consistent, proving the hypothesis that 
when the promise of membership is distant, i. e. membership is not the 
immediate reward, compliance will hardly be stimulated (Ibid.). This 
can be observed also from the point of changed enlargement dynamics 
in general and the Union’s capacity to deliver the eventual reward of 
membership. Complex political environment in the Western Balkans, 
coupled with a lack of reforms and legacies of inter-ethnic violence, and 
multiplied by the tough lessons learned from the previous rounds of 
enlargement, made both EU institutions and Member States "more cau-
tious and reluctant in putting forward a clear membership perspective" 
(Dobbels 2009: 4). Deeply entrenched feeling of "enlargement fatigue", 
concerns over the "absorption capacity" of the EU, and remnants of the 
severe economic crisis from the previous decade, effected what is now 
a much stricter policy of conditionality, in which "even technical steps 
in the accession process previously considered to be mere formality, are 
increasingly being linked to certain conditions and more difficult to ac-
complish" (Dobbels 2009: 28). This undoubtedly had an impact on the 
effectiveness of the ICTY conditionality, as this requirement was consid-
ered as an essential part of the process leading to the EU membership.
d. Domestic costs of adopting rules for governments, societal 
mobilization and supportive formal institutions
In the polity dimension, key facilitating factor is the presence of a lib-
eral democratic government, or a liberal party constellation, in which 
the major political parties agree on liberal reforms and integration into 
Western international organizations (Sedelmeier 2005: 14). In such con-
text, adaptation costs of complying with the EU’s demands for govern-
ments are not prohibitively high. On the contrary, domestic costs with 
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regards to the EU’s demands increase in the case of dominance in parlia-
ment of nationalists over liberal ethnic policy preferences (Sedelmeier 
2005: 15). Governments’ adjustment costs and political constraints are 
also related to various instances of historical legacies, which consider-
ably affect different aspects of democratization (Ibid.). For example, in 
the policy dimension a low number of veto players is a key facilitating 
factor.
Domestic politics hold the key to compliance with identity- and sov-
ereignty-sensitive conditions (Noutcheva 2006: 2). In Western Balkans 
countries, the domestic costs of complying with EU conditionality are 
often very high, as some of the requirements tackle sensitive questions 
of statehood and national identity. The specific nature of the EU’s polit-
ical conditions also makes it easier for nationalist politicians for which 
they create adjustment costs to challenge their legitimacy (Sedelmeier 
2005: 31). Hence, ICTY conditionality managed to stir up nationalism 
and undermine the popularity of moderate forces in domestic politics 
(in Croatia marginally, in Bosnia and especially Serbia significantly). 
Large part of the job was carried by the powerful politically-influenced 
right-wing nationalist media, which contributed to creation of an at-
mosphere of promoting nationalism, rejecting cooperation with ICTY 
and anathematizing everyone who endorsed facing the war legacies and 
advocated reforms, thus effectively undermining any basis for cooper-
ation with the Tribunal (Dobbels 2009: 18). Under such circumstances, 
the political costs of advocating cooperation with the ICTY were very 
high, and it became increasingly difficult to establish a pro ICTY-re-
gime, since nationalist parties gained more popularity and were often 
needed (particularly in Serbia) to form a majority (Ibid.).
ICTY conditionality in these countries was accompanied by a neg-
ative influence of formal domestic factors, in a setting described as 
"diffused power" (Serbia) or "hybrid politics" (Bosnia). Political costs 
entailed by cooperation were particularly high since it dealt with the is-
sue of national identity, coupled with negative domestic public opinion, 
which resulted in reluctant adaptations of the political elites due to the 
re-election concerns or fears of political instability. There was also lack 
of political will to reform the structures of main influential veto play-
ers – army, security services, etc., some of which were directly or indi-
rectly involved in committing war crimes (Dobbels 2009: 25). In Serbia 
moreover, national identity was particularly fragile at the moment when 
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ICTY conditionality was applied the most aggressively, in the light of 
anticipated prospect of Montenegrin and Kosovo secession, which also 
raised the chances of further nationalist reactions and hence added po-
litical turbulence for the government (Rajković 2008: 59).
The capacity of compliance with conditionality is influenced by the 
number of veto players in the institutional structure of the target state. 
In Serbian case, the ousting of Milošević was not followed by the neces-
sary changes in state structures, power was decentralized across various 
parts of the government and its security services, and it was arguably the 
main obstructing force for cooperation with ICTY conditionality (Dob-
bels 2009: 17). This made pro-European leaders who did wish to cooper-
ate with the ICTY unable to openly condemn war criminals or engage in 
tough political action to reform these institutions. Finally, as a result of the 
ICTY conditionality, instead of EU integration enjoying social consen-
sus in Serbia, it reopened identity issues, divided the society and boosted 
discourses on sovereignty, victimization of nation, "double standards of 
international community" and injustice perpetrated to Serbia by inter-
national community’s one-sided handling of war crimes (Milenković & 
Milenković 2013: 199). Even in instances of compliance with the ICTY 
conditionality dominant justifications remained strictly instrumental and 
not as a value in itself: cooperation with The Hague was presented as "an 
unfortunate and resented imposition" that must be complied with for oth-
er reasons, namely to satisfy the EU but also to boost Serbia’s international 
credibility when it came to contesting Kosovo’s independence in terms of 
international law (Batt & Obradović-Wochnik 2009: 11).
Specific situation existed in an arguably semi-sovereign country like 
Bosnia, where the ICTY conditionality incurred higher compliance 
costs as it "intervened in the sovereignty suggesting a redefinition of 
internal statehood structures" (Noutcheva 2006: 2). Limited coopera-
tion with the ICTY came only from one of the two entities (Republika 
Srpska), whose authorities had not turned over a single ICTY indict-
ee (Memišević 2009: 57), which contributed to holding back the entire 
country from the progress in the EU accession process. The other entity 
(Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had always complied prompt-
ly with ICTY requests, appearing to be the exception in the region in 
showing genuine will to cooperate with The Hague (Hartmann 2009: 
77). Genuine commitment and positive compliance record of this ma-
jority-Bosniak entity can be explained by the fact that their own com-
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munity suffered the greatest number of casualties during the war in Bos-
nia, as well as by motivation to bring justice for their own victims and 
at the same time to see their former enemies who had attempted to dis-
mantle Bosnia sentenced at the international level (Ibid.). Another spec-
ificity with regards to domestic institutional capacities in Bosnia was 
role of the High Representative of the International Community, who 
often used the ICTY issue as a justification for removing obstructionist 
officials, freezing assets, and even re-shaping Bosnian state institutions, 
especially in the defence and security sectors (Ibid.), which is another 
peculiar example of interplay of the EU and another international actors 
in pursuing ICTY conditionality.
As for the element of supportive institutions influencing the compli-
ance with ICTY conditionality, there was in general serious reluctance 
on the part of Western Balkans governments to commit themselves to 
creating the formal conditions necessary for war crimes accountability. 
For instance, the police assistance to ICTY requests remained half-heart-
ed at best, in part because police officers were often themselves impli-
cated in the commission of war crimes (Hartmann 2009: 78). In Croa-
tia particularly difficult was establishing civil-democratic control and 
oversight of the security sector, heavily stuffed with the legacy of former 
communist regime and linked with organized crime dating back to the 
war period. Therefore initially, while the investigation on the where-
abouts of general Gotovina was de facto the most important issue for 
Croatian government, the Ministry of Defence was at the same time 
still paying his pension contributions (Watkins 2005: 3). Similarly to 
societal reactions in Serbia, ICTY conditionality in Croatia influenced 
political discourses and public opinion by challenging national identity 
which was partially built on the patriotic war and national heroes from 
the 1990s (Perković 2013: 2). This issue was arguably the strongest one 
polarizing post-authoritarian Croatian political scene (Jović 2009: 1). 
EU’s insistence on this requirement and subsequent postponement of 
negotiations following the failure to extradite national war hero caused 
public frustration, which in turn eroded the support for EU integration 
whilst Euroscepticism and nationalism were on the rise (Perković 2013: 
17). What followed was the ever lowest level of public support for EU 
membership in Croatia which did not recover substantially since 2005, 
and as a consequence the motivation to join the Union remained mostly 
with the domestic political elites (Ibid.).
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e. Legitimacy of EU demands, and of the process through which the 
EU formulates demands and promotes rules
A number of factors increase the likelihood for effective persuasion and 
socialization: at the international level, some of the most important are 
the legitimacy of the substantive rules that the EU promotes, as well 
as the legitimacy of the process through which the EU promotes such 
rules (Sedelmeier 2005: 15). If a candidate country considers that the 
process through which EU conditions are formulated as legitimate, it is 
more likely to adopt these rules (Ibid.). Facilitating factors thus include 
the participation of the target countries in setting conditions and the 
making of rules, which is always problematic in the case of candidate 
countries, especially when coupled with heavy power asymmetry as 
aforementioned. Furthermore, substantive rules are more likely to be 
perceived as legitimate if they are codified internationally or in the EU’s 
own acquis. The conditions for candidates must be normatively consis-
tent and backed up by a strong international consensus on the technical 
and political appropriateness of policy prescriptions (Ibid.).
There are couple of elements aggravating the legitimacy and compli-
ance record of the ICTY conditionality. The ICTY’s jurisprudence was 
in general met with high mistrust and doubts over its legitimacy in all 
Western Balkans countries. Since the majority of those indicted were 
Serbs, it initially came under fire for being used as a political instrument 
with an anti-Serb bias; when it started indicting Croats, it came to be 
seen as having a bias against Croats as well (Sadkovich 2011: 155). Bos-
niaks who were seen by some as the only real victims of the 1990s wars 
were outraged when some of their leaders have been indicted too, and 
after certain perpetrators of war crimes against their ethnic group have 
not been sentenced to longer terms in prison. Given the ICTY’s failure 
to communicate its indictments and verdicts accurately, public opinion 
both in the region and internationally tended to interpret particular ver-
dicts as exonerating or victimizing the entire nation, thus undermining 
the Tribunal’s legitimacy (Orzechowska 2013: 137). Moreover, "unex-
pected redefinitions and reinterpretations of the international law" have 
created a huge space for "subjective assessment and flexible facts man-
agement", hence coming under the great suspicion of the public and 
legal professionals, and weakening the legitimacy of the ICTY rulings 
too (Ibid.).
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f. Identification with the EU, and positive normative resonance with 
domestic rules
EU’s impact on democracy and human rights is generally considered to 
be rather limited, but positive (Sedelmeier 2005: 19). If the EU was not 
sufficiently sensitive to the implications of its interventions in domestic 
politics for national sovereignty, it undermined liberal-democratic poli-
ticians and NGOs, since their authoritarian and nationalist rivals could 
present them as "agents of foreign powers" (Ibid.). Political actors may 
face the difficult situation in which the "end goal", i. e. EU membership 
is societally approved, whereas some of the criteria for membership are 
disapproved, e. g. ICTY conditionality (Freyburg & Richter 2010: 14).
In Croatia, the EU’s insistence on the ICTY conditionality at cer-
tain point played into the hands of the Eurosceptics and set back gov-
ernment efforts to promote the EU as the best possible option, but this 
backlash was minor in a real effect since the Croatian public largely 
agreed on idea that "Croatia belongs to a Western European community 
of nations" (Watkins 2005: 3). Different situation is in Serbia, where the 
electorate is still more evenly split on this issue: be it from the public 
lack of confidence for a states that contributed to the NATO military 
intervention in Serbia, or alleged undesirability of the whole process of 
EU integration due to the recent serious economic turmoil, or historical 
connections with Russia, etc. Thus, EU’s condition of full cooperation 
with the ICTY in Serbia had serious detrimental effect on democratic 
reforms, and the negative perception of the ICTY bolstered anti-reform 
forces at the expense of the liberal-democratic movement (Sedelmeier 
2005: 19).
In the Western Balkans, mechanisms of transitional justice (laws 
on war crimes, investigations, tribunals and commissions) were never 
fully developed, nor had a real political support (Obradović–Wochnik 
2009: 31). Laying the foundations for strong justice system would have 
ensured better support for ICTY cooperation, giving more legitimacy 
to the ICTY in the public sphere (Ibid.). Narrowly interpreting the Co-
penhagen political criteria in the SAP, and focusing exclusively on full 
cooperation with the ICTY while ignoring domestic mechanisms of 
transitional justice, the EU has missed an important opportunity to en-
courage the region’s governments and societies to acknowledge and deal 
with mass atrocities committed during the conflicts (Rangelov 2006: 
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375). Ignoring domestic transitional justice processes has allowed the 
persistence of ethno-nationalist ideologies and denial of responsibility 
for war crimes, thus "obstructing both the process of rebuilding the rule 
of law and international justice’s goal of facilitating lasting peace and 
reconciliation in the Western Balkans" (Ibid.). Instead, as in the Serbian 
case after the death of PM Đinđić, different governments made some 
poor attempts to deal with the war crimes issue, with every attempt be-
ing severely undermined or criticized by "large and vocal nationalist 
parties" such as the Serbian Radical Party (Obradović-Wochnik 2009: 
31). Their military officers indicted by the ICTY for alleged war crimes 
were even voluntarily and ceremoniously transferred to The Hague as 
national heroes (Rajković 208: 57). In Croatia as well as in Bosnia, the 
great number of the ICTY indictees was perceived by a large part of the 
society and political elite in their homeland as heroes and defenders, 
while the public awareness of the war crimes committed by members of 
their ethnicity during the war remained very weak (Orzechowska 2013: 
135). Such negative public opinion functioned as a brake for coopera-
tion and eroded the efficiency of the ICTY conditionality.
Compliance with the ICTY conditionality was moreover not estab-
lished as rooted in a value-related basis (Orzechowska 2013: 137). Con-
sequently, the capturing and extraditions have been frequently treated 
in the region as payoffs or payments for rewards/carrots, not an ele-
ment of a consistent process of reconciliation and dealing with the past 
(Ibid.). Coupled with a weak legitimacy of the Tribunal, it resulted in 
declining trust among the Western Balkans societies towards the ICTY 
and lower public support for the cooperation, which negatively influ-
enced the public support for the EU integration too. Also, the political 
and societal reactions in the region following the crucial trials and ver-
dicts in The Hague followed "the everlasting narrative of the war" (Ibid.). 
Finally, these extremely emotional and everything-but-substantial reac-
tions further divided the public opinion, as well as deteriorated the in-
ter-ethnic and regional relations, thus aggravating ICTY conditionality 
and conflict transformation processes.
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3. Concluding Remarks
This essay is an attempt to provide generalized summary of the history 
of ICTY conditionality, exploring it through the lenses of Sedelmeier’s 
conceptual framework and selected independent variables. Following 
is an overview of the main findings on preconditions affecting ICTY 
conditionality, observed on the basis of selected cases and independent 
variables.
Both theoretical approaches separately manage to present factors 
which ultimately impaired effectiveness of the EU policy of ICTY con-
ditionality in Western Balkans. Put together, given that certain variables 
observed are interrelated, they provide for a clearer picture explaining 
troublesome and inconsistent both compliance and application record 
of the ICTY conditionality.
Rationalist institutionalism offers more examples showing how the 
limited effectiveness of the ICTY conditionality could be encountered 
in the serious cost-incentive gap, given the considerable mismatch be-
tween the high domestic compliance costs and unsupportive factors in 
polity domain on the one hand (even in the case of Croatia), and the 
weak clarity, credibility and rewards of EU conditionality policy on the 
other. EU Member States were furthermore often divided on the ques-
tion of standard of application of ICTY conditionality, and this lack of 
consensus caused the loss of credibility of EU conditionality. Credibility 
was arguably affected as well by the tension between the EU condition-
ality which is derived from the political processes of pre-accession ne-
gotiations, and the institution (ICTY) granted with tasks of reporting 
on compliance which in order to be effective needs to maintain inde-
pendence from any political pressure. Departure from consistent ap-
plication and clear interpretation of requirements eventually weakened 
the overall EU leverage in relation with Western Balkans. In the end, 
rationalist approach conveniently suggests explanation on the basis of 
cost-benefit calculation for the EU opting to compromise on the ICTY 
conditionality, and taking more lenient stance in light of the poor record 
of economic and political reforms in the Western Balkans.
Sociological institutionalism offers couple of interpretations of con-
stellation of both international and domestic factors influencing ICTY 
conditionality, mainly revolving around salience of the issue (i. e. na-
tional identity) this type of conditionality was intrinsically linked to. The 
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EU did not succeed to clearly establish link between the policy of ICTY 
conditionality with underlying values of democracy and respect for the 
rule of law, which also caused negative domestic support for the EU re-
quirement, even in Croatian case where identification with the EU was 
greater than in other two countries. Effectiveness of the ICTY condition-
ality was moreover impaired due to lack of legitimacy of the Tribunal 
and its controversial and politicized judgments. Finally, constructivism 
presents how the ICTY conditionality, being a "culturalised" requirement 
and more suitable to tackle with social learning mechanisms which take 
time to effectuate, lacked time and appropriate (internal and external) 
tools to succeed in a relatively short time span of its application.
The analysis of the factors affecting the EU policy of ICTY condi-
tionality in Western Balkans had important repercussions on the overall 
accession process of the countries observed. The most favourable condi-
tions were present in Croatia, which was the first country to join the EU 
in 2013. The ICTY conditionality, which provoked an unprecedented 
stall in the accession process due to Gotovina case, was the main factor 
explaining Croatia’s postponed accession in comparison with two other 
countries (Bulgaria and Romania) with comparable political-economic 
reform accomplishments and other pre-accession requirements com-
pliance record, yet which joined the EU already in 2007. Less favour-
able conditions, as present in Serbia and Bosnia, are in part explaining 
the slow progress of both countries towards the full EU membership. 
Serbian negotiations on the SAA were suspended until some of the 
most-wanted war crime suspects were handed over. Also, progress of 
Bosnia and conditions to be met before it could be recommended for 
concluding the SAA were tied with the requirement of full cooperation 
with the ICTY, particularly in the case of its entity of Republika Srpska 
(Rangelov 2006: 368). In addition, now when Croatia is an EU Member 
State, it came back to condition and exert pressure on Serbia and impose 
conditions threatening with vetoing its EU accession progress, all relat-
ed to the Chapter 23 of the membership negotiations, which deals with, 
inter alia, Serbia’s universal jurisdiction for prosecuting war crimes of 
the Balkan wars, but also cooperation with the ICTY with regards to 
the case of Serb radical nationalist Šešelj, who was released from The 
Hague’s custody before the first instance judgment was issued, and con-
tinued to stir the nationalist tensions in his media statements and politi-
cal appearances.
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Apart from these generalized conclusions on the interplay of factors 
effecting the EU policy of ICTY conditionality in Western Balkans and 
the overall accession process of the three countries observed, further 
research needs to focus on assessing the importance of (un)favourable 
conditions in each country and juxtaposing these theoretical assump-
tions to empirical findings on the cooperation of selected countries with 
the ICTY and successfulness of the EU-imposed ICTY conditionality.
In the end, relevance of the present analysis and discussion is reflect-
ed in the importance of the modification of the EU’s approach towards 
pre-accession conditionality dealing with transitional justice and recon-
ciliation, in light of the future prospective enlargements to regions emerg-
ing from violent civil and ethnic wars, such as Ukraine or Armenia.
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Pretpristupni politički uvjeti Europske unije  
za zapadni Balkan:  
analiza primjene i poštivanja uvjeta suradnje sa  
Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju
Sažetak
Proces pristupanja država zapadnog Balkana Europskoj uniji je kao jedan od 
pretpristupnih političkih uvjeta uključivao i suradnju sa Međunarodnim kazne-
nim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju (Haaški tribunal). Ovaj uvjet je bio usvojen kao 
jedan od najvažnijih elemenata EU politike uvjetovanosti za zapadni Balkan, te 
je značajno dominirao vanjskopolitičkim programom EU u odnosima sa drža-
vama zapadnog Balkana. Ovaj rad analizira strukturalne preduvjete u pojedinim 
državama zapadnog Balkana (Bosna i Hercegovina, Hrvatska i Srbija), te razma-
tra učinak uvjeta suradnje sa Haaškim tribunalom na dinamiku pretpristupne 
europeizacije te tri države. Polazeći od osnovnih pretpostavki racionalističke i 
sociološke/konstruktivističke teorije, rad prati najvažnije međunarodne i doma-
će faktore koji su olakšavali ili otežavali ostvarenje EU političkog uvjeta suradnje 
sa Haaškim tribunalom. Glavni cilj rada je prikazati i opisati učinke primjene i 
poštivanja uvjeta suradnje sa Haaškim tribunalom, te objasniti zašto je u ko-
načnici taj proces bio znatno otežan i nedosljedan. Glavni argument je da se 
u slučaju svake pojedine države u predmetnoj analizi mogu pronaći značajne 
strukturalne prepreke koje su ugrožavale učinkovitost suradnje sa Haaškim tri-
bunalom, čime se objašnjava konačni neuspjeh politike primjene i poštivanja EU 
političkog uvjeta suradnje sa Haaškim tribunalom.
Ključne riječi: Europska unija, zapadni Balkan, pretpristupni politički uvjeti, 
Međunarodni kazneni sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju, međunarodni i domaći olakšava-
jući i otežavajući faktori
